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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of trade liberalization in terms of tariff cuts
within the Eastern European enlargement on German and Austrian firm
productivity. Unique matching of data from 1994 to 2003 suggests that tariff
reductions raise parent firm productivity significantly. A ten percentage point
decrease in tariff rates can lead to total factor productivity gains of up to 2
percent. The data allow distinction between three types of tariffs: output,
intra-firm and input tariff rates. The size of the results strongly depends on
the type of tariff and country analyzed.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing process of trade liberalization has removed much protection-
ism. Worldwide it has gone so far that the Economist Intelligence Unit1 has
found that business executives’ fear of protectionism is relatively low com-
pared with, for example, worries about a recession (The Economist 2008).
The Economist ’s article (2008) reports that the Doha round and trade bar-
riers are seen as increasingly unimportant. On the one hand, it justifies the
question whether there is additional need to study the impact of liberalized
trade. On the other hand, trade liberalization is important. Conversely,
owing to a new threat of protectionism, The Economist (2008, p.30) also
argues that “multilateralism matters more than ever”: inter alia, it mentions
the “symbolic importance” (The Economist 2008, p.30) of Doha, restricted
investments (Marchick and Slaughter 2008), as well as raised food demand,
oil production quotas and relative scarcity (Mattoo and Subramanian 2008).
Moreover, a recent study by Amiti and Konings (2007) focus on the impor-
tance of tariffs and the firm’s international value chain, analyzing the impact
of liberalized trade on intermediate inputs and productivity. Marin (2008)
points out the importance of international trade through a rise in intra-firm
trade and the development of international value chains. There is continuing
importance of trade liberalization and its broad impact on micro as well as
macro perspectives.
Trade liberalization and its impact on firm productivity are studied in
different ways and for a wide span of countries. On this note there are
different definitions of liberalized trade and its link to productivity. As stated
by Amiti and Konings (2007), however, only a few papers study the effect on
productivity of liberalized trade in terms of both output and input tariffs.
Moreover, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no study about German and
1 A sister company to The Economist ; see The Economist (2008).
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Austrian trade liberalization with regard to Eastern Europe. That is, there
is no empirical evidence about liberalized offshoring via tariff cuts which
distinguishes between different kinds of tariff rates and their impact on total
factor productivity.
Particularly in the case of Germany and Austria, however, this topic is
of paramount interest. First, because of the German unification in 1990
there are significant productivity differences among regions and firms, espe-
cially between the services and manufacturing sectors (Temouri et al. 2008).
Second, as argued by Marin (2008), a fact of increased global competition is
that Germany and Austria are the countries most affected by Eastern enlarge-
ment. They are the most important investors in Eastern European countries.
Up to two-thirds of total imports within the European Union (EU27) can be
ascribed to intra-firm imports between old and new EU member states. The
German Federal Statistical Office (2008b) indicates that 60 percent of Ger-
man companies undertaking offshoring decide in favor of the new EU member
states. Within this group of firms more than 60 percent relocate their core
functions and auxiliary functions, respectively. Third, within these offshoring
activities firms reorganize their structure towards flatter hierarchies resulting
in easier communication, greater responsibility and greater firm productiv-
ity (Marin 2008, Marin and Verdier 2008). Fourth, Germany and Austria
are internationally the most integrated countries within the European Union
(Marin 2008). For instance, Germany’s medium-sized firms are the great-
est exporters compared with other European countries like France or Italy
(Mayer and Ottaviano 2007a). Moreover, Marin (2008) shows that trade
openness with new member states - measured in imports plus exports over
GDP - increased from 1994 to 2006 in Austria by 7.2 percentage points and
in Germany by 5.4 percentage points. Fifth, there are considerable effects of
trade liberalization in terms of tariff cuts the firms may respond to.2 This
2 More details on this follow in Section 4.3.
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promotes intra-industry competition which in turn boosts productivity and
therefore GDP growth (Mayer and Ottaviano 2007a).
This study deals with the analysis of tariff reductions and their impact
on German and Austrian productivity. Motivated by theoretical papers like
those of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Feenstra et al. (1992), Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001), Melitz (2003), and Luong (2008), the findings are in
favor of supporting trade liberalization. That is, as argued by Melitz (2003),
liberalized trade exposes domestic firms to increased competition which forces
inefficient establishments to exit the market. This in turn shifts the average
productivity up. The described selection effect (Melitz 2003), however, does
not raise within-firm productivity. Productivity growth within each firm is
provided by improved access to cheaper inputs, higher quality, foreign tech-
nology (Grossman and Helpman 1991) and a greater variety of intermediates
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Feenstra et al. 1992, Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001).
As argued by Luong (2008) the impact of improved access to foreign inputs
via tariff cuts depends on both the affected tariff rate (output vs. input tar-
iffs) and the elasticity of substitution between existing and newly available
intermediate inputs. The effects of tariff cuts on productivity gains are esti-
mated by Amiti and Konings (2007). Section 2 gives an extensive overview
of existing empirical studies and their main differences.
Following Amiti and Konings (2007), the results of this paper are pre-
sented in two steps. In the first step I estimate the firm-specific TFP for
each two-digit ISIC sector using different dependent variables and regression
methods for Austria and Germany separately. The second stage presents the
estimation results of productivity on tariff rates. In contrast with Amiti and
Konings (2007), intra-firm tariffs are included that capture the offshoring
relationship between parent firms and their Eastern European affiliates. The
results of this step are obtained at plant level. The underlying sources are
the Amadeus database provided by the Bureau van Dijk (Bureau van Dijk,
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Electronic Publishing 2005), the WITS database (World Bank and UNC-
TAD 2008) and a unique set of German and Austrian investments in Eastern
Europe matched for the years 1994 to 2003.3
The study finds empirical evidence for a significant negative impact of
tariffs on firm-level total factor productivity. In line with the small amount
of existing literature which distinguishes between different kinds of tariffs,
the effect of input tariffs exceeds that of intra-firm as well as output tariffs.
The impact for a ten percentage point decrease in the tariff rates raises firm
productivity between 0.3 and 2.0 percent depending on the type of tariff and
country. Reducing tariffs on output goods by ten percentage points can lead
to productivity gains at firm-level of 0.4 percent, whereas reducing tariffs
on intermediate inputs by ten percentage points can lead to productivity
gains of up to 1.6 percent. The results of reducing intra-firm tariffs by ten
percentage points suggests productivity gains of 0.7 percent. The effect of
liberalized trade is greater for Austria than for Germany. Moreover, foreign-
owned firms located in Germany and Austria seem to benefit more from
tariff cuts compared with domestic firms. Their total factor productivity
gains are greater by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. The results also suggest
that a fraction of the positive impact of offshoring on productivity is induced
by reduced tariff rates. Comparison of the results with the existing literature
about Brazil or Indonesia shows that the effect of Eastern European trade
liberalization for Germany and Austria is much smaller. This can be traced
back to some quite intuitive facts. First, Indonesia is a developing country far
from the technological frontier, suggesting larger marginal effects. Second,
liberalized trade with Eastern Europe explains only part of German and
Austrian trade activities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a review, by no means
exhaustive, of the related empirical literature to which the paper refers.
3 A more detailed description of the underlying datasets follows in Section 3.
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In particular, this section emphasizes the study and underlying estimation
method of Amiti and Konings (2007), which provides the main motivation
for this analysis. Section 3 gives an overview of the data. Section 4 describes
the underlying estimation methodology, illustrates the construction of the
total factor productivity and tariff variables in more detail, and gives some
descriptive facts about tariff rates and the firms’ productivity. Section 5
presents the estimation results of liberalized trade in terms of reduced tariffs
on TFP. Section 6 gives evidence for the robustness of the empirical findings.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This section summarizes the existing literature on the relationship between
liberalized trade and firm productivity. More precisely, it cites empirical
studies about the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ total factor pro-
ductivity. After considering this set of empirical literature arranged by coun-
try and underlying samples, the section focuses on the Indonesian study by
Amiti and Konings (2007).
2.1 Related Literature
Beside the theoretical papers mentioned in the introduction a huge amount
of empirical literature has addressed, both directly and indirectly, the rela-
tionship between trade liberalization and productivity.
An important strand of literature studies empirically the relationship of
imports and exports with productivity. For Japanese firms, Tomiura (2007)
finds that corporations investing abroad are the most productive firms. Sim-
ilarly, Sjoholm (1999) argues that Indonesian firms in the manufacturing in-
dustry show increased productivities with an increasing amount of exports.
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Moreover, Muuls and Pisu (2007) find that not only exports count. Their
data for Belgium suggest that firms that export and import are the most
productive. The same evidence for Italian firms is provided by Castellani et
al. (2008). German plant level data studied by Wagner (2002) suggest that
exporting firms are associated with higher labor productivity.4 Moreover,
Vogel and Wagner (2008) also give evidence for an existing self-selection in
Germany. They find a positive impact of firms’ productivity on their im-
port activities.5 In terms of Eastern Europe, Hagemejer and Kolasa (2008)
find within their study on Polish data that internationalized firms are the
most productive. Halpern et al. (2005) study the contribution of imports to
Hungarian productivity. Their results on firm-level data show productivity
boosted through access to a larger variety and different qualities of imported
intermediate inputs as well as reallocation of output-determining input vari-
ables. Within the theoretical framework it is implied that the access to
foreign inputs, the relative quality, and the reallocation of capital and la-
bor can raise productivity. Using the Olley-Pakes approach (1996), Halpern
et al. (2005) enhance the unobserved productivity function by the number
of varieties imported. This circumvents the problem of zero investment re-
port.6 Halpern et al. (2005) find that from 1992 to 2001 a ten percentage
point increase in the share of imports raised TFP by 1.8 percent. Aggregat-
ing the firm-level data the authors find that imports explain 30 percent of
aggregated productivity growth. One half of the whole effect can be sepa-
rated into the reallocation of inputs, and the other half can be traced back
to import activities.
All these studies explain possible productivity boosts and related prob-
lems mainly in terms of an underlying self-selection problem. None of them,
4 See also Bernard and Wagner (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (1999), p.2ff.
5 See also Altomonte and Bekes (2008), who find that self-selection holds for both
importing and exporting firms.
6 The authors point out that 25 percent of the firm data report zero investments.
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however, takes account of potential triggers for rising import and export ac-
tivities. That is, none of them studies the effect of liberalized trade on total
factor productivity in terms of quotas, reduced tariffs or other trade policy
variables.
Kasahara and Lapham (2008) consider the link between trade liberaliza-
tion and intermediates, exports and productivity. Reduced trade restrictions
allow for a larger amount of imported intermediates. This in turn raises
productivity within the firm, which itself allows for exports. A greater de-
mand for labor forces the less efficient firms to exit the market. De Loecker
(2007a) finds that relaxing product-specific level and quota restrictions leads
to productivity gains in the Belgian textile industry. Using an enhanced
Olley-Pakes methodology (1996) for the production function estimations that
additionally controls for unobserved price variable biases (De Loecker 2007a,
p.22ff), the author finds productivity gains of 4 percent. Liberalized trade
forces the inefficient producers to exit, which leads to an increase in average
productivity (De Loecker 2007a, p.3ff). In Bernard et al. (2006) reduced
trade costs, measured by changes in tariff and freight costs, have a posi-
tive impact on productivity growth, a negative effect on plant death and are
positively associated with a switch from being a non-exporter to being an
exporter as well as export growth.
A positive effect of trade liberalization on productivity is also found by
Pavcnik (2002). Her data on Chilean plants in the manufacturing industries
yield an aggregated rise in total factor productivity of 19 percent. On the
plant level she argues that there is a difference between producers acting
in import-competing sectors and plants acting in non-traded goods sectors.
The effect of liberalized trade on non-traders and traders ranges between 3
and 10.4 percent, respectively, and is because of “reshuffling (of) resources
from the less to more efficient plants [...].” (Schor 2004, p.261). Plants with
inefficient production are forced to close down owing to foreign competition
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(Schor 2004, p.265).7 Another study on Chilean manufacturing is presented
by Alvarez and Crespi (2007). Their study does not give direct evidence of
liberalized trade effect on productivity. The authors study the determinants
of the convergence of low-productivity firms on the technological frontier
for Chilean plant-level data under (almost) free trade policy from 1979 to
1998 (Alvarez and Crespi 2007, p.3). Using the Levinsohn-Petrin technique
(2003) for the productivity estimations at the three-digit industry level shows
that the plant-specific productivity gap interacting with the share of foreign
firms has a significant positive effect on productivity growth. Therefore it
suggests that domestic firms benefit from access to foreign technology. This
positive effect of importing intermediate inputs in the Chilean manufacturing
industry is more precisely studied by Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008). Using
a wide range of estimation techniques their results suggest that importing
foreign inputs increases firm productivity by at least 2.6 percent.
Empirical results for trade liberalization in terms of a Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) and reduced tariffs on productivity are more precisely studied
by the following authors. Head and Ries (1999) study the impacts of FTA
on output. After introducing their theoretical part, which considers dif-
ferent models of imperfect competition, the authors test their predictions
on Canadian industry data. At industry level Canadian tariff reductions
of ten percentage points reduce output by at least 11.3 percent. In con-
trast, a reduction of the same amount in US tariff rates increases output
by 16 percent. Summarizing their findings, Head and Ries (1999, p.309ff)
show that both tariff reductions offset each other in their impact on outputs.
The impact of the Canadian-U.S. FTA on productivity is studied by Trefler
(2004). His study offsets the short-run costs with the long-run benefits of the
country-specific changes in FTA-mandated tariff concessions. Estimates of
tariff concession effect on employment growth and labor productivity shows
7 See also Luong (2008), p.2ff.
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an employment loss between 12 and 24 percent for Canada and a loss of 3
percent for the US in the short run. In contrast, tariff concessions show long-
run gains owing to increasing labor productivity ranging between 8 and 15
percent for Canada and between 4 and 14 percent for the US.8 The largest,
15 percent, rise in labor productivity can be ascribed to import competition
effects (Trefler 2008, p.880).
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find that Mexican tariff rates are on the
one hand positively correlated with costs and on the other negatively cor-
related with productivity growth. Therefore liberalized trade shifts the av-
erage cost curve downward and raises sector-specific efficiency. Fernandes
(2007) explores the impact of nominal tariffs on Colombian plant produc-
tivity. Calculation of TFP in accordance with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
shows that a 10 percentage point tariff cut raises productivity between 0.8
and 2.9 percent. Because the effect is greater for firms with higher imports
of intermediate inputs, the author argues that one channel is the access to
foreign innovations (Fernandes 2007, p.68). All these studies present results
for the impact of output tariffs. The measurement and potential link of input
tariffs with productivity are still missing.9
Schor (2004) studies the impact of nominal output and input tariff rates
on TFP of 27 Brazilian sectors at the two-digit SIC level. Her estimates
for manufacturing firms from 1986 to 1998 show a significant negative effect
of both tariff measures on productivity. With the Olley-Pakes technique
(1996) adding input tariffs reduces the coefficient of nominal tariffs and yields
predicted impact of the input tariffs’ coefficient, which gives between 1.5 and
2.7 percent productivity gains for a ten percentage point tariff cut. Schor
(2004) argues that the results give evidence of two effects. The first one is the
import competition effect reflected by the estimates for nominal tariffs. The
8 The results depend on the estimation methods as well as on the underlying data
(industry versus plant-level data).
9 See also Luong (2008), p.2.
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second effect is the improved access to foreign technology derived from the
negative coefficient for input tariff rates (Schor 2004, p.390). These links for
the Brazilian manufacturing sectors are more precisely studied by Muendler
(2004). He finds that the effect of increasing foreign competition on the
product market raises firm productivity enormously. The impact of foreign
inputs is not, however, as large as expected; it is more the effect of inefficient
firms leaving the market which leaves the internal productivity untouched.
A famous example of trade liberalization effect on productivity is the
case of India. Beside the more recent studies by Goldberg et al. (2008)
and Topalova (2004), Krishna and Mitra (1998) find evidence that the trade
reform in India has a positive association with productivity growth. Their
dummy model of liberalized trade in 1991 shows between 3 and 6 percent
productivity growth. Topalova (2004) finds average productivity gains of 0.5
percent induced by a ten percentage point tariff cut. Similarly to Krishna
and Mitra (1998), apart from the mentioned outcome she also finds a faster
productivity growth rate using manufacturing industry and plant level data
from 1986 to 1993. Goldberg at al. (2008) put more emphasis on the role of
input tariffs. Their findings of a reduction in the input tariff rates in India
suggest that trade liberalization makes imported intermediates cheaper and
gives firms access to a greater variety of new inputs and foreign technology.
This in turn increases domestic variety. To sum up their findings, lower
tariff rates raise imported varieties in intermediate as well as in final good
sectors. Lowering input tariffs by ten percentage points increases, among
other things, total factor productivity by 4.5 percent.
Amiti and Konings (2007) find empirical evidence of plant productivity
gains for Indonesian firms because of trade liberalization. A cut in both
output and input tariffs raises productivity via increasing competition and
variety as well as quality effects. The particular role of the growth of input
tariffs is shown by the study. The productivity gains of tariff reductions on
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intermediate inputs is significantly negative and ranges from 3 percent for
non-importing firms to 12 percent for importing firms. These findings as well
as the underlying methodology are the subject of the following subsection.
Closely related is Luong’s (2008) study about Mexican data. Similarly to
Amiti and Konings (2007), Luong (2008) distinguishes between output and
input tariffs but additionally shows that there is a difference between high and
low differentiated products. There is a rise in firm total factor productivity
owing to lower input tariffs if inputs are highly differentiated. Productivity
also increases owing to lower output tariffs if intermediate inputs are not
highly differentiated. Therefore his results are driven by the elasticity of
substitution among inputs (Luong, 2008, p.11ff).
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study about the relationship be-
tween German or Austrian trade liberalization and Eastern European coun-
tries and firm-level total factor productivity. Temouri et al. (2008) estimate
German total factor productivity from 1995 to 2004. In their second step,
however, they show productivity differences owing to foreign affiliates and
parent multinationals. Unfortunately, they do not link this with trade liber-
alization. As stated in the introduction, however, for Germany and Austria
in particular it would seem to be very valuable to study the impacts.
2.2 Study by Amiti and Konings (2007)
Amiti and Konings (2007) give empirical evidence that Indonesian firms bene-
fit from trade liberalization. Their study provides information about Indone-
sian plants between 1991 and 2001 on, inter alia, revenue, labor, investments
and imported inputs. Information on intermediate inputs is available for each
firm in 1998. This measurement is used for creating input tariffs. It allows
the authors to distinguish between the impacts of both output tariff rates
and input tariff rates on firm productivity. Whereas the benefits of reduced
output tariffs are realized via import competition, the gains of input tariff
11
cuts are realized by learning, variety effects and foreign technology.10 The
output tariff is measured by the average of all HS nine-digit product codes
for each five-digit ISIC sector. The input rate is constructed as a weighted
average of the output tariff. In this context the weights are given by the
sectoral cost shares of one input good over all imported intermediate inputs
per parental sector.11 The authors point out that the tariff rates are given at
the industry level to avoid endogeneity problems (Amiti and Konings, 2007,
p.1620). Importantly, Amiti and Konings (2007, p.1612) observe that the
input weights are only available for 1998 with the consequence of a constant
technology assumption over time.
To test the impact of trade liberalization on productivity, Amiti and
Konings (2007) run an OLS regression with fixed effects. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function the authors estimate the total factor produc-
tivity for each three-digit ISIC sector via an enhanced Olley-Pakes technique
(1996) to avoid unobserved productivity impacts on the input coefficients.
The estimation method takes account of the problem of simultaneous causal-
ity between the error term, including the productivity shock and the depen-
dent variable within the firm’s decision on input factors. To control for the
correlation between the inputs and the error term a strict positive correla-
tion between investments and the unobserved productivity shock is assumed
(Olley and Pakes 1996). It controls for the simultaneity problem and pro-
vides a consistent coefficient for labor. Moreover, the method also takes
account of a selection bias resulting from firms leaving the market. The
semi-parametric estimation method also controls for this problem by esti-
mating survival probabilities (Yasar et al. 2008). It allows me to obtain in
a second step a consistent coefficient for capital.12 Besides controlling for
10 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1613ff.
11 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1619ff.
12 For a detailed discussion of the underlying estimation method see Amiti and Konings
(2007), p.1635, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Section 4.2 about the total factor productivity.
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unobserved productivity shocks and exits of firms, the authors modify the
Olley-Pakes (1996) technique by controlling for the firm’s import and export
decision (Amiti and Konings 2007, p.l635ff). The Olley-Pakes (1996) method
implies that investment function depends on trade, productivity shock and
capital. Hence, within the underlying data the existence of data on firm
investments and the import and export decision allows estimation of consis-
tent values for the input coefficients. In a further step the authors run a
fixed-effect regression to estimate how trade liberalization affects TFP.
Their estimation results show a negative impact of output tariffs on pro-
ductivity. The coefficient in terms of absolute values ranges from 0.7 percent
to 6.4 percent with a ten percentage point change in output tariffs. The value
as well as the significance depends strongly on the underlying specification.
A larger and significant negative effect is provided by the results for input
tariff rates. For a ten percentage point decrease the coefficient for input
tariffs ranges from 1.8 percent to 7.9 percent for non-importing plants and
from 4.1 to 11.8 percent for importing firms. Therefore the effect for firms
importing intermediate inputs is much larger than the gains for firms that
compete with foreign inputs (Amiti and Konings, 2007, p.l621ff). In this
context, Amiti and Konings (2007, p.1614) argue that trade liberalization
and therefore lower tariff rates can be thought of as lowering the price of
international outsourcing and therefore raising firm productivity.
The findings are robust owing to a large number of alternative speci-
fications and estimation methods. They show that in terms of a potential
omitted variable bias problem it is necessary to include input tariff rates when
estimating the effect of trade liberalization on firm productivity (Amiti and
Konings 2007, p.1621). Due to the coefficient’s value and significance the
impact of input tariffs is existent and even larger than the impact of import
competition itself.
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3 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies mainly on the matching of two datasets. The
first is a detailed cross-sectional dataset of 660 global corporations based
in Germany and Austria. The survey was conducted from 1990 to 2001
by the Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich. The
sample represents 80 percent of German total investments in Eastern Eu-
rope and 100 percent of total Austrian investments in Eastern Europe. As
a whole it consists of 2,123 German and Austrian investment projects. The
employed version provides firm-level information on the parent investors in
Austria and Germany, their corresponding affiliates in Eastern Europe and
the actual investment and the parties’ relationship. The survey reports, inter
alia, detailed information on parent and affiliate firm-specific measures like
capital stock, labor endowments, research and development investments and
skill endowments. It also includes detailed information on underlying rela-
tionships like ownership share, investments and imports. Out of the unique
data this study uses measures about intra-firm imports, more precisely, the
type and amount of intermediate inputs between the parent firm and her
corresponding Eastern European affiliate.13
The second dataset is the pan-European micro database Amadeus re-
leased by the Bureau van Dijk (Bureau van Dijk, Electronic Publishing 2005).
The version used includes firm-level data for more than 1.5 million national
and multinational establishments in 38 European countries for up to 13 years,
finishing in 2005. I use unconsolidated data provided on tangible assets, em-
ployees, material costs, and revenue as well as added value and the ultimate
owner for over 209,000 German and more than 30,000 Austrian firms.14 In
addition to that I match the cross-sectional dataset on Eastern European
13 See Marin (2004, 2008) for further description of the data.
14 For further information on the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk 2005) available
online see http://www.bvdep.com/en/Amadeus.html [September, 16th, 2009].
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investment projects with Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005) to obtain an en-
hanced panel structure. It results in an unbalanced panel of 417 German
and Austrian firms covering a period of ten years from 1994 to 2003. Data
are collected until the end of 2003 to avoid potential bias by the eastern
enlargement from the beginning of 2004.
To answer the question how trade liberalization affects firm-level produc-
tivity I take the simple average of effectively applied tariff rates for each
three-digit Eastern European affiliate industry provided by the World Inte-
grated Trade Solution database (WITS ) (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008).15
In the period 1994 to 2003 these data are merged for each year with the out-
come of the first two matchings mentioned above. The new dataset allows
me to identify the impact of tariff rates on productivity between Eastern
Europe and the old European members Germany and Austria. A detailed
description of the variables and the procedure follows in the next section.
4 Estimation methodology
4.1 Basic Estimation Equation
The empirical analysis studies the question whether liberalized trade has a
significant positive impact on German and Austrian firm-level total factor
productivity. Considering the related literature, I expect different contribu-
tions owing to the kind and character of the observed tariff rates. Therefore
I expect a negative sign for all tariff rates raising firm-level productivity in
the following ascending order: a decrease in output tariff raising productivity
less than a cut in intra-firm tariffs; the largest contribution is expected from
a cut in input tariff rates. The reason behind this expectation is access to
15 WITS (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008) gives access to the major trade and tariff
data from the UN COMTRADE database, the TRAINS database, and the IDB and CTS
databases. For these and further information on WITS (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008)
see http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb [September, 16th, 2009].
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foreign inputs as well as the mentioned competition effects. This should hold
for both Austria and Germany, whereas the impact of a tariff reduction for
Austrian firms is expected to be larger than for German corporations. More-
over, the study tries to answer whether foreign-owned and importing firms
benefit more than purely domestic and non-importing firms. I expect multi-
nationals that are more familiar with foreign environments to enjoy greater
productivity effects from tariff reductions than domestic firms (Temouri et
al. 2008, p.44ff). The estimation strategy also suggests that trade liberal-
ization makes offshoring cheaper and this in turn is positively linked with
productivity.16
Thus, the main estimation equation of interest is
TFP kit = β0 + β1(Outtr)
k
t + β2(Inttr)
k
t + β3(Inptr)
k
t
+ β4δ
k
t + ηi + ηj + ηt + it,
(1)
where (Outtr)kt is the average of the effectively-applied output tariffs with
which each parent firm’s three-digit ISIC sector level is confronted. (Inttr)kt
and (Inptr)kt are weighted averages of the sectoral output tariffs. (Inttr)
k
t
measures intra-firm tariffs, that is, nominal tariffs at the affiliates’ sectoral
product level weighted with intra-firm imports from industry j to the parent
industry k over all intra-firm imports of sector k. This measure contains all
kinds of offshored products. (Inptr)kt weights tariff rates with the amount of
each intermediate input imported from a three-digit affiliate sector j over all
imports of sector k. I also include a set of variables δkt containing the number
of shareholders, foreign ownership, a dummy for importing firms and their
related interaction terms with tariff rates. The number of shareholders and
the nationality of the owner are provided by the Amadeus dataset (Bureau
van Dijk 2005). In this context a foreign owner is defined as the firm’s global
ultimate owner who is not of German (or Austrian) nationality and holds
16 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1614.
16
directly or indirectly at least 50.01 percent. The results are estimated by
ordinary least square (OLS) with robust standard errors. Firm, industry
and year fixed effects are included to avoid endogeneity problems owing to
time-invariant and time-variant effects given by ηi, ηj and ηt.
4.2 Total Factor Productivity
Following the methodology of Amiti and Konings (2007), in a first step I
estimate the firm’s total factor productivity. It is defined as the residual of
the production function, and hence the difference between the actual value
Yit and the estimated value Yˆit. Therefore I consider a simple Cobb-Douglas
production function in the following way:
Yit = Ait(τ)L
γl
itK
γk
it , (2)
where Yit is measured by the value added of firm i at time t, Lit is the number
of employees in i at time t and Kit is the capital endowment of firm i at time
t. Except for labor, all variables are deflated.17 I estimate the following
log-log specification,
yit = γ0 + γ1lit + γ2kit + uit, (3)
for each country and each sector separately. It allows identification of the
firm’s TFP as mentioned above. For comparison, I proceed with the same
specification with revenue as dependent variable. Thus, the specification is
yit = γ0 + γ1lit + γ2kit + γ3mit + vit, (4)
where mit measures applied materials. All variables are given in natural logs.
17 I deflate in two different ways. On the one hand manufacturing and service sectors
are deflated by the producer price index and the consumer price index, respectively. On
the other hand I include year dummies while estimating TFP. The methods result in
similar outcomes, especially in the second step when the impact of tariffs on productivity
is considered.
17
To obtain unbiased coefficients for the input variables the ordinary least
square (OLS) procedure is not very reliable (Olley and Pakes 1996, Levin-
sohn and Petrin 2003, Ackerberg et al. 2005). Yasar et al. (2008) show that
an estimation technique not controlling for simultaneity and the mentioned
selection bias provides upwards-biased coefficients for labor, capital, and ma-
terials. That is, the residuals uit in Equation 3 and vit in Equation 4 contain
an unobserved productivity shock which has an impact on the firm’s decision
on the input factors. Unfortunately, the impact is unobserved by econome-
tricians. Firms, however, take the shock within their productivity process
into account. The so-called transmitted component results in a simultaneous
causality problem between the explained and the explanatory variables. This
in turn induces biased coefficients by OLS related to a correlation, especially
between capital and the error term as stated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003,
p.319ff).18 Owing to this problem the coefficients γˆl, γˆk, and, in the case of
revenue as dependent variable, γˆm, are estimated for each two-digit ISIC clas-
sification by use of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach. This estimation
method avoids the simultaneity problem via intermediate inputs in order to
control for the unobserved productivity shock. Hence, contrary to Olley and
Pakes (1996), the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) technique does not require any
measurement of investments. This is important because the underlying data
within this study report many zero investments or provide insufficient data
on firm-level investments. In addition, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argue
that investments do not entirely catch productivity shocks owing to adjust-
ment costs. Therefore the authors suggest intermediate inputs as proxy to
circumvent data-specific problems and to solve the endogeneity problems.
Similarly to the investment proxy, by assuming a strictly monotonous rela-
tionship between the proxy (intermediate inputs), capital accumulation and
18 See also Olley and Pakes (1996), Ackerberg et al. (2005), and Alvarez and Crespi
(2007).
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the unobserved shock, the approach controls for the transmitted component
which has an influence on the firm’s decision itself (Olley and Pakes 1996,
Pakes 1996). Hence, it is part of the error term in Equations 3 and 4, respec-
tively. Thus, the transmitted component νit is specified by νit = ft(kit,mit).
It allows me to estimate a consistent γˆl by approximating the relationship
between materials, capital and productivity shock via a fourth-order poly-
nomial in kit and mit. Considering value added as dependent variable the
estimation equation can be written as:
yit = γ1lit + θt(kit,mit) + uit (5)
defining
θt(kit,mit) = γ0 + γ2kit + ft(kit,mit). (6)
In a first step the elasticity of labor is obtained by approximating θt(kit,mit)
by a fourth-order polynomial. The consistent results provided in the first
stage allow me estimating a consistent coefficient on capital in a second step
by again approximating an unknown function of lagged values of θt.
19 That
is, the following equation is estimated:
yit − γ1lit = γ2kit + g(θt−1 − γ2ki,t−1) + uit + τit. (7)
Following the described procedure I implement overall material costs as
proxy to estimate a reliable production function. I concentrate more on value
added as dependent variable than firm revenue. The reason is that value
added is expected to give more serious results owing to the fact that within
the value added specifications material costs are used as pure proxy compared
with the revenue estimates where an additional coefficient is estimated for
materials. This avoids the danger of collinearity problems.20 Tangible fixed
19 In the case of revenue as dependent variable the elasticity of material inputs mit is
also obtained in the second step.
20 See also Ackerberg et al. (2005).
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assets are used for capital measurement and labor is measured by the number
of employees. Owing to the fact that the number of observations per sector in
the underlying panel of the 417 German and Austrian firms is very low, I do
not expect to obtain reliable results on industry level. For this reason I run
the Levinsohn-Petrin technique (2003) in two different ways. First, I do not
distinguish between each industry, using the whole underlying sample of 417
firms in the period from 1994 to 2003 to estimate the designated elasticities.
This method relies on the assumption that there are no productivity differ-
ences between the sectors. Owing to this weakness I alternatively estimate
the TFP in each two-digit sector for each country separately for over 209,000
German and more than 30,000 Austrian firms from 1994 to 2003. These
results are obtained from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk 2005). For
comparative reasons the coefficients are also estimated by simple OLS. Ta-
bles T3.2 and T3.3 in the Appendix report the results obtained by OLS and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with value added as dependent variable Yit for
Germany and Austria.21
4.3 Tariff Rates: Construction and Descriptives
The data on tariff rates between parent firms and their Eastern European
affiliates are provided by the WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD
2008). As shown by Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) it is important to
consider applied tariff rates.22 Output tariff rates are translated from the
product level into the four-digit ISIC industry classification as a simple av-
erage for each parent sector. Following Amiti and Konings (2007), to obtain
21 Owing to the fact that a huge amount of literature exists which criticizes Olley
and Pakes (1996) as well as Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (e.g. Ackerberg et al. 2005,
Wooldridge 2005) I have to point out that this discussion is beyond the scope of my
analysis.
22 Contrary to bounded tariff rates the by countries effectively applied tariff rates show
an significant decrease from 1986 to 2006. This accompanies with increasing trade in
goods. See Mattoo and Subramanian (2008) as well as The Economist (2008).
20
intra-firm and input tariff rates the effectively applied tariffs are weighted as
follows. The sample of 417 firms provides information on intra-firm imports
as well as intermediate inputs directly imported mainly for one year in the
period from 1997 to 2001. Therefore the sector-specific intra-firm weights,
v
1997/2001
jk , are calculated by the ratio of industry k’s imported products from
industry j to all imported products by industry k.23 Similarly, input tariffs
are calculated by weighting nominal tariff rates with the aggregated ratio of
imported inputs between each parent-affiliate relationship. That is, the value
of imported inputs of industry j in the production of a good in the parent
sector k over all inputs imported by sector k. This procedure allows me to
estimate the relationship between trade liberalization in terms of tariff cuts
at industry level and firm productivity. Formally, the weights are:
(Inttr)kt =
∑
j
v
1997/2001
jk ∗ (Outtr)jt , (8)
(Inptr)kt =
∑
j
w
1997/2001
jk ∗ (Outtr)jt . (9)
The intuition is as follows. The most important import industry for a parent
firm in sector k over all existing affiliate industries is weighted the most.24
Following Amiti and Konings (2007), tariff rates are calculated at an aggre-
gated industry level. The larger the tariff rate on a core good the larger is
its importance in analyzing the impact of trade liberalization.
The underlying data show that there are significant tariff reductions be-
tween Germany, Austria and Central and Eastern European region.25 Signif-
icant reductions are important because firms may respond to the liberalized
environment and this could lead to a change in the productivity structure,
outside the firm as well as within the firm boundaries. From 1994 to 2003
23 All values are aggregated from plant level up to industry level and measured in Euros.
24 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1620.
25 See Appendix, Table T3.4 for the whole list of Eastern European countries considered
in this study.
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the maximum rates of nominal tariffs for all reported products between the
parent EU countries (Germany and Austria, respectively) and Eastern Eu-
rope fell from 74 percent to 25 percent, a reduction by roughly 50 percentage
points. Figure 1 shows how the maximum values of effectively-applied tariff
rates change over time.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2 02 2003
73.9 94.2 66.9 58.6 47.5 43.8 35.4 32.0 18.8 25.1
Note: Values are applied tariff rates (AHS) in percent, given as maximum rates of all four-digit affiliate/product level for a
total of 144 industries. Source is the WITS database. Author's calculations.
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Notes: Values are maximum applied tariff rates (AHS) in percent, calculated as simple average
of each three-digit affiliate level for a total of 70 industries.
Source: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008).
Figure 1: Change in output tariffs (1994 - 2003)
This general finding also holds for an additional range of descriptive sum-
maries. As presented in Figure 2, the median, the interquartile range, and
the maximum values are also decreasing over time. The firms may respond
to this variation over all products in terms of access to foreign technology
and greater variety, and therefore a change in their productivity. Owing to
liberalized trade, tariff variation is reduced over time.26 In this case partic-
ularly, firms respond to these tariff cuts, when the parent industry imports
from more than one affiliate industry. In the underlying data a parent indus-
26 See also Luong (2008), p.16ff.
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try at the three-digit classification imports on average from three different
three-digit affiliate sectors.
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Source: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008). Author’s calculations.
Figure 2: Output tariff variation over time (1994 - 2003)
Tariff rates with the largest initial level in 1994 incur the greatest cut from
trade liberalization compared with 2003. Figure F3.1 in the Appendix shows
the graph on all existing three-digit industry levels. There is a significant
negative correlation which affirms the large tariff reductions of initial tariff
rates. Moreover, all tariffs are close to the 45-degree line. This confirms
that almost all industries show considerable tariff cuts by at least 50 percent
within the considered period.
These findings suggest a relationship between tariff cuts and a productiv-
ity boost on the firm level. Figure 3 shows a negative link between tariffs and
23
Notes: The sources are the WITS database, the AMADEUS database, and the Chair for International Economics, University 
of Munich. The values are given on a 3-digit parent-industry level. Due to large outliers the upper 5%-quantile of the revenue 
summary is excluded in each year presented.
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Figure 3: Tariff rates and labor productivity
productivity. In the sample period from 1994 to 2003 intra-firm tariff rates
decreased while labor productivity of German and Austrian firms investing
in Eastern Europe mainly increased during these phases. The same finding is
obtained by considering tariff rates and productivity measured in real value
added per employee. Figure 4 presents the outcome.27
Another aspect of the relationship between increasing productivity and
decreasing input tariffs is documented in Figure 5. Firms are ranked by their
labor productivity, whereby a low-level firm is in the lower 25th percentile, a
medium firm ranges between 25 and 75th, and a high productivity is in the
upper 25th percentile. The figure shows that more productive corporations
27 The findings hold also for both countries Germany and Austria separately. Values
are deflated by the corresponding producer price index provided by the German Federal
Statistical Office (2008c) and Austrian National Bank (OeNB 2008), respectively.
24
Note: Sources are the Wits database, the Amadeus database, and the Chair for International Economics, University of
Munich. Values are given at a simple average over all parent firms per year. Owing to large outliers the upper 5%-quantile of
the value added summary is excluded. Author's calculations.
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Figure 4: Tariff rates and real value added
are confronted with, on average, lower input tariff rates. Hence, German and
Austrian parent firms have liberalized access to foreign technology, greater
variety and lower-priced intermediate inputs which in turn may boost their
productivity.
Highly productive corporations are confronted with lower tariff rates com-
pared with low-productive firms. Whether this in turn incentivizes intra-firm
imports is shown in Figure 6. Low versus high productivity is determined
by the firm’s median labor productivity measured in real value added per
employee. The figure suggests that less productive corporations have lower
intra-firm imports in percent of parent sales compared with firms in the highly
productive segment. It suggests that corporations practicing offshoring via
significant tariff cuts play an important role in determining the impact of
trade liberalization on productivity. Therefore, liberalized trade in terms
25
Note: Productivity is measured by firms' revenue-employee ratio for all given parent firms in each three-digit
industry. Low productivity means firms in the lower 25%- percentile, high productivity firms in the upper
25% percentile. Tariffs on inputs are the weighted sum of the sectoral average tariff rates on imported inputs
from all corresponding Eastern European industries affiliated to the parent industry (three-digit ISIC
classification). Data sources are the WITS database, Amadeus and the Chair for International Economics,
University of Munich. Author's calculations.
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Sources: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008), Amadeus database (Bureau van
Dijk 2005) nd Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 5: Input tariffs and labor productivity
of lower tariff rates lowers the price of offshoring and boosts productivity.28
These effects take place outside the firm boundaries and within the firm.
5 Empirical Results
This section analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on firm-level produc-
tivity. The total factor productivity having been obtained, Equation 1 is
estimated by simple OLS with fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
natural log of TFP calculated by using the firm’s real value added. In this
first set of calculations the productivity estimations are not run for each sec-
28 See Amiti and Konings (2007), p.1614ff.
26
Note: Intra-firm imports are given at parent firm level in percent of parent sales. Productivity is low if the
firm's real value added per worker is equal or below the median firm and it is high if the firm’s real value
added per employee is equal or larger than the median corporation. Source is the WITS database and the
Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author's calculations.
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Sources: WITS database (World Bank and UNCTAD 2008) and Chair for Inter-
national Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 6: Tariff rates and offshoring
tor separately. That is, the coefficients for labor and capital are calculated
using the set of 417 firms. To produce valid statistical inferences, the errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Table 1 reports the results. Column (1) suggests that an increase in the
output tariff reduces the firm productivity. The sign of the coefficient for
tariffs is negative and significant. A decrease of ten percentage points in the
tariff rate improves productivity by 0.54 percent. Column (2) additionally
includes intra-firm tariffs. The coefficients for both tariff rates are negative
and highly significant. The coefficient for output tariff falls, however, when
the intra-firm tariff is included. It seems that the productivity effect through
access to foreign technology has an important impact. Ignoring this variable
would lead to a biased coefficient for the output tariff measure. The out-
come suggests the existence of both effects: the competition effect described
by Melitz (2003) as well as productivity-improving effects of foreign qual-
ity (Grossman and Helpman 1991), greater variety (Feenstra et al. 1992)
27
and access to products at a reduced rate. The negative impact is larger for
foreign-owned firms as reported in column (3). The largest negative effect on
productivity is given by the coefficient for the input tariff rate. The positive
impact of trade liberalization on productivity is smaller in the final market
compared with intermediate inputs. The coefficient for input tariff is, how-
ever, not significant. Column (5) also reports an insignificant coefficient for
input tariff rates but the impact of input tariff and the interaction with im-
porting firms IM is as expected. In line with Amiti and Konings (2007), the
effect is greatest for importing German and Austrian parent firms.
Table 2 uses the more reliable natural log of the productivity measure
TFP calculated separately for each industry over 209,000 and 30,000 firms
located in Germany and Austria, respectively. The set of the first four speci-
fications shows an insignificant coefficient for the output tariff. This insignif-
icant impact is in line with Amiti and Konings (2007) and can be explained
by the framework described by Luong (2008). Inclusion of the intra-firm tar-
iff rate, however, shows a negative and significant impact. A ten percentage
point decline in the tariff rate raises productivity by 0.55 percent. Con-
trolling for foreign-owned firms FO, column (4) suggests that having easier
access to foreign products increases productivity. This impact is stronger
for foreign-owned firms by 0.4 percent.29 It indicates that a ten percentage
point increase in the intra-firm tariff rate results in almost a 1 percent boost
in the firm productivity. At this time inclusion of the input tariff rate shows
a negative and significant coefficient. If input tariff rates are reduced by ten
percentage points the access to foreign intermediates raises productivity by
more than 1.2 percent. Column (7) reports a greater impact of reducing
input tariff rates compared with intra-firm tariffs. Although the impact for
importing firms is larger than for non-importing firms column (8) reports
only insignificant results. That is, contrary to Amiti and Konings (2007),
29 A ten percentage point increase in intra-firm tariff rate is assumed.
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Table 1: Tariff rates and TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
tariffsj -0.0540*** -0.0518*** -0.0513*** -0.0518*** -0.0544***
[0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0050]
intra-firm tariffj   -0.0537*** 0.0418 -0.0535*** -0.0666***
[0.0197] [0.0317] [0.0198] [0.0218]
input tariffj -0.0587 0.0047
[0.0744] [0.0880]
FO 0.2460*
[0.1265]
FO * intra-firm tariffj -0.0968***
[0.0299]
IM 0.0066
[0.0251]
IM * input tariffj -0.1244
[0.1357]
fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Observations 2083 2079 2079 2079 1745
Dependent variable: tfp it (real value added)
Note: A constant term as well as year, country and firm fixed effects is included throughout all specifications.
Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is the total factor productivity at the plant level [i]
in industry [j] and year [t]. Tfp is obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with real value added as dependent
variable. A constant technology for all industries is assumed. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the parent
industry level. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariffs weighted with imported goods from an
affiliate industry for all imported goods. Input tariff is the sum of the secotoral average tariff rates weighted
with the industries' mean of imported inputs in percent of parents' sale. IM is a dummy equal to one if the
value of imported goods between the parent firm and its affiliate is greater than zero. FO is a dummy equal to
one if the global ultimate owner is a foreigner. The number of the corporate shareholders worldwide is
included as control throughout all specifications. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-
levels, respectively.
s: A constant term as w ll as year, country, and firm fixed effects are included through-
out all the specifications. Robust stan ard e rors are in brackets. The dependent variab e is
the total factor productivity at the plant level i in industry j and year t. TFP i obtained
by Levinsoh a d Petrin (2003) with real value added as dependent variabl . A consta t
technology for all industries is a sumed. Tariffs are sectoral tariff ra es at the parent indus-
try level j. Intra-fir tariff is the s m o sec oral average tariffs w ighted with impor ed
goods from each r lated affiliate industry. I put tariff is the sum of the sectoral average
tariff rates weighte wi h the industries’ mean of imported inputs in percent of parents’ sale.
IM s a dummy equal to one if the value of imported goods between t e parent firm and
its affiliate is greater t an zero. FO s a dummy equal o one f th global ultimate owner
is a fo igner. The number of the corporate shareholders worldwide is included as control
throughout all the specifications. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level, respectively.
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there is unfortunately no single evidence of productivity gains from greater
variety or learning effects controlled for by the interaction between importing
firms IM and the intra-firm tariff rate. An F-test showing that all variables
controlling for any type of tariff rates are different from zero is, however,
significant.
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Owing to the fact that the data consist of German and Austrian firms,
Table 3 reports the results for the country differences. The country dummy
is equal to one if the firm is located in Germany and zero if the observation
relates to Austria. All three specifications show that productivity gains from
liberalized trade are greater for Austria than for Germany. This holds for
all three types of tariff rates. Again, the impact of reducing intra-firm tariff
rates is greater compared with the output tariff coefficients.
Amiti and Konings (2007) give an additional interpretation for trade lib-
eralization. They argue that reduced tariff rates “lower the price of interna-
tional outsourcing” (Amiti and Konings 2007, p.1614, fn 11). In this context,
lower tariffs increase offshoring and this in turn boosts firm productivity.
Go¨rg et al. (2008) also study the impact of international outsourcing on pro-
ductivity.30 In order to investigate the effect the results obtained stepwise
for the offshoring channel are reported in Table 4.
In columns (1) to (3) offshoring measured as intra-firm imports in per-
cent of parent sales is regressed on tariffs. Including controls, column (3) of
Table 4 shows that a falling output tariff rate raises the offshoring activities.
Column (4) suggests that offshoring in turn is positively linked with firm
productivity. Increasing intra-firm imports significantly raises the firm’s real
value added. If increasing firm-level productivity is explained by greater off-
shoring and therefore by greater variety of and easier access to foreign goods,
the coefficient for tariff rates is expected to be insignificant or equal to zero.
Column (5) suggests that both offshoring and trade liberalization have a sig-
nificant impact. The sign of the coefficient for intra-firm imports is positive,
as expected. The impact, however, is reduced. That is, trade liberalization
incentivizes offshoring and this in turn raises productivity. Besides that, a
positive effect of reduced output tariffs on productivity remains. This is also
30 For a detailed discussion on the existence of further empirical studies, see Go¨rg et
al. (2008), p.671ff.
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Table 3: Country differences
(1) (2) (3)
tariffsj -0.2183*** -0.0837** -0.0838**
[0.0397] [0.0364] [0.0366]
tariffsj * country 0.1831*** 0.0800** 0.0803**
[0.0298] [0.0379] [0.0380]
intra-firm tariffj -0.1603*** -0.1602***
[0.0388] [0.0389]
intra-firm tariffj * country 0.1210*** 0.1215***
[0.0434] [0.0436]
input tariffj -0.1432
[0.1153]
input tariffj * country 0.0682
[0.1226]
country 0.3156*** 0.1349 0.2219**
[0.0680] [0.0902] [0.0971]
fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Observations 1669 1665 1665
Dependent variable: sectoral tfp it  (real value added)
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is
the sectoral total factor productivity at the plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. Tfp is 
obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for each sector separately with real value added
as dependent variable. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the parent industry level. Intra-
firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted with imported goods from
one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input-tariff is the sum of the sectoral
average tariff rates weighted with the intermediate inputs ratio imported from one Eastern
European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is a dummy
equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal to zero if the parent firm is Austrian. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Notes: A constant term as well as year, industry, and firm fixed effects is included through-
out all specifications. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent variable is
the sectoral total factor productivity at the plant level i in industry j and year t. TFP is
obtained by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for each sector separately with real value added as
dependent variable. Tariffs ar sectoral tariff rates at the parent industry l vel. Intra-firm
tariff is the sum of sectoral ave age tariff r tes weighted with imported goods from one
affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input-tariff is the sum of the sectoral average
tariff rates weighted with the intermediate inputs ratio imported from one Eastern Euro-
pean affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is a dummy equal to
one if the parent firm is German and, contrary, equal to zero if the parent fir is Austrian.
*, **, *** ind cat significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
33
T
ab
le
4:
C
h
an
n
el
of
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
s
an
d
off
sh
or
in
g
on
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
in
tra
-f
irm
 im
po
rts
-
-
-
0.
00
35
**
*
0.
00
30
**
0.
00
31
**
0.
00
31
**
0.
00
30
**
*
[0
.0
01
1]
[0
.0
01
2]
[0
.0
01
3]
[0
.0
01
2]
[0
.0
01
1]
ta
rif
fs
j
-0
.1
18
3
-0
.1
73
0*
*
-0
.1
64
4*
-0
.0
15
2*
*
-0
.0
12
7*
-0
.0
12
7*
-0
.0
11
6
[0
.0
86
5]
[0
.0
86
8]
[0
.1
02
3]
[0
.0
07
1]
[0
.0
07
4]
[0
.0
07
5]
[0
.0
08
3]
in
tra
-f
irm
 ta
rif
f j
-0
.0
11
9
-0
.0
11
8
-0
.0
14
1
[0
.0
14
7]
[0
.0
21
0]
[0
.0
17
7]
ln
 (L
)
-1
.6
53
3*
**
-1
.5
24
5*
**
-0
.0
10
9
-0
.0
02
8
[0
.4
59
6]
[0
.5
14
0]
[0
.0
15
0]
[0
.0
25
9]
ln
 (K
)
0.
26
54
0.
01
23
[0
.3
23
7]
[0
.0
16
7]
in
du
st
ry
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
A
dj
. R
2
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
02
0.
02
0.
03
0.
03
0.
01
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
78
3
74
3
48
1
12
62
58
6
56
1
52
9
33
1
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 in
tra
-f
irm
 im
po
rts
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 ln
 (r
ea
l v
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
)
N
ot
e:
A
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
as
w
el
la
s
a
co
un
try
du
m
m
y
an
d
fir
m
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
is
in
cl
ud
ed
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
al
lO
LS
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
.R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
in
th
e
fir
st
se
ti
s
in
tra
-f
irm
im
po
rts
in
pe
rc
en
to
fp
ar
en
ts
al
es
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
in
th
e
se
co
nd
se
ti
s
th
e
re
al
va
lu
e
ad
de
d
at
pl
an
tl
ev
el
[i]
in
in
du
st
ry
[j]
.T
he
da
ta
ar
e
on
pr
oj
ec
tl
ev
el
fo
rt
he
ye
ar
19
99
.T
he
re
fo
re
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
ca
n
be
la
rg
er
th
an
41
7
fir
m
s.
Ta
ri
ffs
an
d
In
tr
a-
fir
m
ta
ri
ff
ar
e
th
e
av
er
ag
e
an
d
w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
ta
rif
f
ra
te
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y,
fo
r
ea
ch
pa
re
nt
-a
ff
ili
at
e
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
on
th
e
Ea
st
er
n
Eu
ro
pe
an
in
ve
st
m
en
tl
ev
el
.L
n(
L)
is
th
e
na
tu
ra
ll
og
of
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fp
ar
en
te
m
pl
oy
ee
s.
Ln
(K
)
is
th
e
lo
g
of
th
e
pa
re
nt
fir
m
's
ca
pi
ta
ls
to
ck
.*
,
**
, *
**
 in
di
ca
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
%
, 5
%
, a
nd
 1
%
 le
ve
ls
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
N
o
te
s:
A
co
n
st
a
n
t
te
rm
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
a
co
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
y
a
n
d
fi
rm
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
is
in
cl
u
d
ed
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
a
ll
th
e
O
L
S
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
se
t
is
in
tr
a
-fi
rm
im
p
o
rt
s
in
p
er
ce
n
t
o
f
p
a
re
n
t
sa
le
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
se
t
is
th
e
re
a
l
v
a
lu
e
a
d
d
ed
a
t
p
la
n
t
le
v
el
i
in
in
d
u
st
ry
j.
T
h
e
d
a
ta
a
re
o
n
p
ro
je
ct
le
v
el
fo
r
th
e
y
ea
r
1
9
9
9
.
T
h
er
ef
o
re
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
ca
n
b
e
la
rg
er
th
a
n
4
1
7
fi
rm
s.
T
a
ri
ff
s
a
n
d
In
tr
a
-fi
rm
ta
ri
ff
a
re
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
a
n
d
w
ei
g
h
te
d
a
v
er
a
g
e
ta
ri
ff
ra
te
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y,
fo
r
ea
ch
p
a
re
n
t-
a
ffi
li
a
te
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
o
n
th
e
E
a
st
er
n
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
in
v
es
tm
en
t
le
v
el
.
L
n
(L
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
re
n
t
em
p
lo
y
ee
s.
L
n
(K
)
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
th
e
p
a
re
n
t
fi
rm
’s
ca
p
it
a
l
st
o
ck
.
*
,
*
*
,
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
,
5
,
a
n
d
1
p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
34
Table 5: Contribution of trade liberalization (in percent)
tariff rate β̂ β̂Austria β̂Germany
output tariff 0.3 - 0.4 0.3 - 0.8 0.03 - 0.4
intra-firm tariff 0.5 - 0.7 0.6 - 1.6 0.4 - 0.6
input tariff 0.6 - 1.6 1.4 - 2.1 0.8 - 1.2
Notes: The table summarizes the average effect of a ten percentage point
reduction of each mentioned tariff rate on firm-level productivity. Author’s
calculations.
affirmed by the following specifications (6) to (8). Inclusion of the intra-firm
tariff variable suggests that a reduced tariff rate incentivizes offshoring and
raises productivity. The impact of the intra-firm tariff itself is insignificant.
The coefficient for offshoring is positive and significant whereas the impact
of tariffs is reduced.
A summary of all findings for a ten percentage point reduction in the
studied types of tariffs is provided by Table 5. First, the contribution of
trade liberalization to productivity is smaller for Germany than for Austria
for all tariff types. Second, in both countries, Germany and Austria, the
contribution of a reduction in intra-firm and input tariffs is larger compared
with lowering output tariffs. This means that lowering the intra-firm tariff
rate by ten percentage points increases German productivity on average by
0.5 percent and Austrian productivity by more than 1 percent. Finally, the
effect is greater for multinationals in both countries.
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6 Robustness
Owing to robustness concerns of the empirical findings, several measurement
and specification issues can be presented in this section. The results reported
in Table 6 are estimated by use of the real value added per employee as
measurement for the firm’s productivity. Beside the impact of output tariffs
all coefficients for trade liberalization have the expected influence. Again,
the impact of input tariffs is greater compared with lowering intra-firm tariff
rates. Multinationals benefit more from lowering tariff rates than domestic
firms. However, inserting the input tariff rate to the specification including
output and intra-firm tariffs, show a statistically insignificant coefficient on
the input variable.
Changing the dependent variable through the firm’s operating revenue
suggests that lower tariff rates increase the firm’s revenue. Throughout all
specifications the capital-to-labor ratio, the firm size, and intermediate ma-
terials are included to analyze the impact on an alternative productivity
measure. The results suggest that trade liberalization has a positive impact.
The effect is largest for the input tariff rate, followed by intra-firm rates and
the output tariffs. Again, the coefficient for the input tariff rate itself is
insignificant. Table 7 presents the estimates.
Tables 8 and 9 affirm the finding that there are significant differences
between Germany and Austria. It holds for both measures real value added
per employee and real revenue per employee, respectively, that generally the
effect for Austria is larger. The exception in both tables, however, is given
by a larger impact of lower input tariffs in Germany than in Austria. The
F-test on all included tariff variables in both columns (3) suggests that the
impacts are significantly different from zero. Moreover, Table 9 reports that
the difference in lower intra-firm tariff rates is not as large as shown before.
Nevertheless, reducing the tariff rates increases labor productivity. In general
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Table 7: Robustness: Trade liberalization and operating revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
tariffsj -0.0379*** -0.0359*** -0.0378*** -0.0359***
[0.0053] [0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0052]
intra-firm tariffj -0.0677*** -0.0674***
[0.0218] [0.0220]
input tariffj -0.1054 -0.0647
[0.0763] [0.0794]
ln (K/L)i 0.4020*** 0.3914*** 0.4027*** 0.3920***
[0.0536] [0.0537] [0.0536] [0.0537]
ln (L)i 0.6345*** 0.6307*** 0.6357*** 0.6315***
[0.0530] [0.0526] [0.0531] [0.0527]
ln (materials)i 0.1723*** 0.1686*** 0.1712*** 0.1680***
[0.0340] [0.0344] [0.0341] [0.0345]
fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Observations 1527 1523 1523 1523
Dependent variable: ln (revenue) it
Note: A constant term as well as year, country and firm fixed effects is included throughout all
specifications . Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is the natural log of
real revenue at the plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the
three-digit ISIC parent industry classification. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average
tariff rates weighted with imported goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods.
Input tariff is the sum of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs
imported from one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates.
Ln(K/L) , is the log of capital over employees. Ln(L) i is the natural log of the number of
employees in the parent firm, ln(materials) is the log of imported goods in th euros. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
s: A cons ant term as well as year, country, and firm fixed effects are incl ded
throughout all the pecifications. Robust standard rrors in b ack ts. The dependent
variabl is the natural log of real revenue at the plant level i in industry j and year t.
Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the three-digit ISIC parent industry classification.
Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted with imported
goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input tariff is the sum of
the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs imported from one
Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Ln(K/L) is
the log of capital over employees. Ln(L) is the natural log of the number of employees
in the parent firm, and Ln(materials) is the log of imported goods in th euros. *, **,
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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the effect is lower compared with the results of Table 3.
Table 8: Robustness: Country differences and value added
(1) (2) (3)
tariffsj -0.1267** -0.0361 -0.0361
[0.0529] [0.0540] [0.0540]
tariffsj * country 0.1078** 0.0222 0.0222
[0.0514] [0.0525] [0.0526]
intra-firm tariffj -0.1560** -0.1561**
[0.0629] [0.0630]
intra-firm tariffj * country 0.1008* 0.1025*
[0.0598] [0.0598]
input tariffj -0.2109*
[0.1133]
input tariffj * country -0.0247
[0.1567]
country -0.2237*** -0.3692** -0.3698**
[0.0765] [0.1660] [0.1661]
fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Observations 1851 1847 1847
Dependent variable: ln(real value added/L) it
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is
the firm's real value added per employee. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the parent
industry level. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted with
imported goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input tariff is the sum
of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs imported from one
Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is a
dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal to zero if the parent firm is
Austrian. Additionally, the natural log of turnover is included as a control variable in each
specification. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: A co stant term as ell as year, industry, fir fixed effects are included
throughout all the specifications. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent
variable is the firm’s real value added per employee. Tariffs are sectoral tariff rates at the
parent industry level. Intra-firm tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff rates weighted
with imported goods fro one affiliate industry over all imported goods. Input tariff is the
sum of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate inputs imported from
one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding intermediates. Country is
a dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal to zero if the parent firm is
Austrian. Additionally, the natural log of turnover is included as a control variable in each
specification. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
The findings also hold when the data are separated into a manufactur-
ing and services classification. The results reported in Table T3.5 in the
Appendix show a significant and positive impact of falling tariffs on produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector. A ten percentage point decrease raises
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Table 9: Robustness: Country differences and operating revenue
(1) (2) (3)
tariffsj -0.1063*** -0.1019*** -0.1027***
[0.0223] [0.0304] [0.0303]
tariffsj * country 0.0738*** 0.0719** 0.0727**
[0.0219] [0.0305] [0.0304]
intra-firm tariffj -0.0635* -0.0636*
[0.0363] [0.0363]
intra-firm tariffj * country 0.0001 0.0007
[0.0397] [0.0398]
input tariffj -0.109
[0.0739]
input tariffj * country -0.0286
[0.1317]
ln (K/L) 0.2954*** 0.2907*** 0.2911***
[0.0432] [0.0432] [0.0432]
ln (L) -0.2664*** -0.2661*** -0.2655***
[0.0378] [0.0378] [0.0378]
country -0.6329*** -0.0243 -0.0285
[0.1503] [0.1820] [0.1811]
fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Observations 2083 2079 2079
Dependent variable: ln(real revenue/L) it
Note: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects is included
throughout all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent
variable is the natural log of real revenue over employees. Tariffs are sectoral tariff
rates at the parent industry level. Intra-firm-tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff
rates weighted with imported goods from one affiliate industry over all imported goods.
Input-tariff is the sum of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate
inputs imported from one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding
intermediates. Country is a dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and equal
to zero if the parent firm is Austrian. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: A constant term as well as year, industry and firm fixed effects are included
throughout all the specifications. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent
variable is the natural log of real revenue over employees. Tariffs are sectoral tariff
rates at the parent industry level. Intra-firm-tariff is the sum of sectoral average tariff
rates weig ted with imported goods f om one ffiliate industry over all imported goods.
Input-tariff is the su of the sectoral average tariff rates weighted with intermediate
inputs imported from one Eastern European affiliate industry over all corresponding
intermediates. Country is a dummy equal to one if the parent firm is German and,
contrary, equal to zero if the parent firm is Austrian. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10, 5, nd 1 percent level, respectively.
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productivity by 0.34 percent. As shown before, the impact is greater for
intra-firm tariff rates. Trade liberalization increases firm productivity by
more than 0.6 percent. The coefficient for the input tariff is not significant.
Moreover, column (4) presents a negative link between the number of share-
holders and the firm’s productivity. Column (5) suggests that multinationals
benefit more from trade liberalization than purely domestic firms. This also
holds for the service sectors. The output tariff rate, however, is no longer sig-
nificant. The coefficients for the intra-firm tariff variable suggest that tariffs
falling by ten percentage points raise productivity by more than 2 percent.
Unfortunately, in the service sector subsample the number of observations
drops significantly.
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7 Conclusion
Even though there is a huge amount of literature on trade liberalization, em-
pirical studies on liberalized trade in terms of both output and input tariffs
in firm productivity are rare. Moreover, there is no detailed study on the
relationship between intra-firm tariffs and productivity in Germany and Aus-
tria which considers the directly preceding periods of the Eastern European
enlargement. This paper argues, however, that it is important, especially for
Germany and Austria as two of the countries most affected by the eastern
enlargement. Therefore, the underlying analysis tries to say to what extent
tariff reductions for Central and Eastern Europe lead to a boost in German
and Austrian firm-level productivity. More precisely, following Amiti and
Konings (2007), the paper considers the determinants of firm-level total fac-
tor productivity. Obtaining productivity by using the Levinsohn and Petrin
technique (2003) that corrects for unobserved productivity shocks, a unique
matching of intra-firm import data finds that tariff reductions significantly
increase total factor productivity. The size of the coefficient depends strongly
in both countries on the type of tariffs: input tariff rates show the largest
effects, followed by intra-firm and output tariff rates. The impact of a ten
percentage point tariff cut ranges between 0.3 and 2 percent. The effect for
Austria is larger than for Germany. The results also suggest that trade lib-
eralization makes offshoring cheaper and this in turn increases productivity.
This channel, among others, is hypothesized by Amiti and Konings (2007) for
Indonesian firms. This study is the only one using data relating to Germany,
Austria and Eastern Europe. Moreover, it is the only one which distinguishes
between tariffs on intra-firm imports and tariffs on intermediate inputs. The
results are in line with findings for other country studies and robust to a wide
range of tests varying the dependent variable and the underlying estimation
specifications.
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Figure F3.1: Change in initial tariff levels
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Table T3.2: German productivity estimations (industry level)
industry capital employees capital employees
14: Other mining and quarrying 0.242 0.766 0.591 0.201
15: Manufacturing - food products and beverages 0.281 0.709 0.275 0.608
17: Manufacturing - textiles 0.158 0.709 0.49 0.588
20: Manufacturing - wood and products of wood 0.095 0.931 0.056 0.591
21: Manufacturing - pulp, paper and paper products 0.232 0.72 0.469 0.41
22: Publishing, printing, reproduction of rec. media 0.182 0.734 0.179 0.701
24: Manufacturing - chemicals and chemical products 0.114 0.886 0.028 0.607
25: Manufacturing - rubber and plastic products 0.321 0.554 0.069 0.542
26: Manufacturing - non-metallic mineral products 0.248 0.625 0.281 0.596
27: Manufacturing - basic metals 0.27 0.685 0.342 0.527
28: Manufacturing - fabricated metal products 0.212 0.71 0.1 0.534
29: Manufacturing - machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.161 0.776 0.382 0.695
31: Manufacturing - electrical machinery 0.151 0.815 0.402 0.685
32: Manufacturing - radio, television, communication 0.4 0.6 0.257 0.706
33: Manufacturing - medical, precision, optical instruments 0.204 0.758 0.065 0.733
34: Manufacturing - motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 0.286 0.668 0.381 0.648
35: Manufacturing - transport equipment 0.188 0.745 0.404 0.593
36: Manufacturing - furniture, n.e.c. 0.182 0.753 0.242 0.751
40: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.308 0.571 0.395 0.367
45: Construction 0.223 0.733 0.186 0.738
50: Sale, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.256 0.633 0.28 0.43
51: Wholesale trade and commission trade 0.155 0.672 0.165 0.669
52: Retail trade 0.201 0.731 0.068 0.705
60: Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.423 0.395 0.311 0.585
62: Air transport 0.09 0.973 0.444 0.011
64: Post and telecommunications 0.186 0.818 0.387 0.921
67: Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.267 0.369 0.587 0.192
72: Computer and related activities 0.23 0.744 0.196 0.784
74: Other business activities                                                         0.23             0.424             0.135            0.608
90: Sewage and refuse disposal 0.175 0.54 0.004 0.6
Dependent variable: real added value it
OLS Levpet
Note: The dependent variable is the firm's real added value at plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. All variables are given in
natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies is included throughout all specifications. The coefficients for each industry
are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations run at a two-digit
ISIC industry level.
te: The dependent variable is the firm’s real added value at plant level i in industry j and
year t. All variables are given in natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies are
included throughout all the specifications. The coefficients for each industry are obtained from
simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations
run at a two-digit ISIC industry level. Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005). Author’s
calculations.
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Table T3.3: Austrian productivity estimations (industry level)
industry capital employees capital employees
15: Manufacturing - food products and beverages 0.438 0.638 0.215 0.702
17: Manufacturing - textiles 0.093 0.924 0.619 0.691
20: Manufacturing - wood and products of wood 0.01 0.393 0.456 0.609
26: Manufacturing - non-metallic mineral products 0.152 0.864 0.559 0.654
27: Manufacturing - basic metals 0.333 0.647 0.711 0.631
28: Manufacturing - fabricated metal products 0.116 0.903 0.51 0.724
29: Manufacturing - machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.049 0.893 0.376 0.813
32: Manufacturing - radio, television, communication 0.236 0.665 0.585 0.809
36: Manufacturing - furniture, n.e.c. 0.19 0.864 0.657 0.322
40: Electricity, gas and water supply 0.688 0.268 0.49 0.597
45: Construction 0.26 0.699 0.206 0.502
50: Sale, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.26 0.614 0.419 0.36
51: Wholesale trade and commission trade 0.179 0.671 0.423 0.113
52: Retail trade 0.15 0.806 0.309 0.886
60: Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.181 0.921 0.398 0.663
63: Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 0.146 0.797 0.607 0.028
67: Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.442 0.27 0.502 0.123
74: Other business activities 0.165 0.476 0.504 0.425
Dependent variable: real added value it
OLS Levpet
Note: The dependent variable is the firm's real added value at plant level [i] in industry [j] and year [t]. All variables are given in
natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies is included throughout all specifications. The coefficients for each
industry are obtained from simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations run at a
two-digit ISIC industry level.
ote: The d pendent variable is the firm’s real added value at pl nt level i in industry j and
year t. All variables are given in natural logs. A constant term as well as year dummies are
included throughout all the specifications. The coefficients for each industry are obtained from
simple OLS estimations and Levinsohn-Petrin estimations (2003), respectively. Calculations
run at a two-digit ISIC industry level.
Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005). Author’s calculations.
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Table T3.4: Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries
Albania Latvia
Armenia Lithuania
Azerbaijan Macedonia, FYR
Belarus Moldova
Bosnia and Herzigovina Poland
Bulgaria Romania
Croatia Russian Federation
Czech Republic Serbia and Montenegro
Estonia Slovak Republic
Georgia Slovenia
Hungary Tajikistan
Kazakhstan Ukraine
Kyrgyz Republic Uzbekistan
Latvia
Source: University of Munich, Chair for International Economics.
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